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The much debated problem of the qualification of judges has two
aspects: First, the general qualification of an individual to be a judge
and, second, his qualification to be a judge in a specific case. Upon
consideration of the first aspect it is necessary to scrutinize the nature
of judicial appointments in general. On the one side is the moral
strength of the individual and his willingness to resist the temptation
afforded by the inherent security of life tenure to devote less than his
total ability to his judicial duties. On the other hand is the possibility
that the lack of life tenure and the necessity of reelection or reappoint-
ment will subject him to pressures which could easily interfere with his
judicial objectivity. As to individual judicial appointments under any
particular system, it would then be necessary to inquire whether the
individual under consideration is generally well educated, aware of con-
temporary problems, sufficiently trained in the law, and sufficiently
intelligent to apply and develop his knowledge. Consideration also
would have to be given to whether he has the physical strength to endure
heavy work without losing his alertness and to whether he has sufficient
moral character to avoid involvement in matters which are unsavory or
would impede his judicial independence.
The second aspect, the qualification to be a judge in a specific case,
has recently become the object of special attention. This aspect has
nothing to do with the nature or method of judicial appointments or the
appointment of an individual person and arises only after the appoint-
ment stage has passed. The problem has been stated with cogence and
breadth by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
The judicial process demands that a judge move within the frame-
work of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought for
ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and submerge pri-
vate feelings on every aspect of the case. There is a good deal of
shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man within it.
It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside private views
in discharging their judicial functions. This is achieved through train-
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ing, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy by
which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted.
But it is also true that reason cannot control the subconscious influence
of feelings of which it is unaware. When there is ground for believing
that such unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment,
or may not unfairly lead others to believe they are operating, judges
recuse themselves. They do not sit in judgment. They do this for a
variety of reasons. The guiding consideration is that the administration
of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as to be
so in fact.'
The breadth of this statement lies in the demand that the administration
of justice should not only be disinterested in fact but should also reason-
ably appear to be so.
An exhaustive study2 has examined the ways in which Anglo-
American common law and American statutory development have dealt
with this problem and the extent to which the solutions reached by these
systems have satisfied the imperative demands that were stated above.
The study also deals with the less subtle involvements of a judge, such
as direct pecuniary interest in the case, relationship to the parties and
prior participation in the proceedings, all of which commonly lead to
the exclusion of the judge in American law.' With regard to prejudice
and bias in the more refined meaning of Justice Frankfurter's state-
ment, the study reveals in detail the astounding variety of rules, prere-
quisites, and procedures in force in the United States controlling the
disqualification of judges.' The objective of the present article is to
examine the manner in which the law of the German Federal Republic
(West Germany) has dealt with this problem.
II
German law regulates the subject of judicial recusation within a
framework of broad codifications. In both the Code of Civil Procedure
(Zivilprozessordnung) and the Code of Criminal Procedure
'Justice Frankfurter, disqualifying himself in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,
466-67 (1952).
2Disqualification of Judges For Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Status,
and the Oregon Experience, 48 ORE. L. REV. 311 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification of
Judges]. For a thorough bibliography of the American commentary on this subject see id. at 407-
10.
31d. at 323-27.
'Id. at 332-48.
'ZIvILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPOI §§ 41-49, Sch6nfelder, Deutsche Gesetze (C.H. Beck Supp.
Nov. 1971) (W. Ger.).
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(Strafprozessordnung),I the problem is treated under the identical title
headline, "Exclusion and Disqualification of Court Personnel." Both
Codes were promulgated in 1877 and have been in force since October
1, 1879. Although both Codes have been changed considerably, the titles
with which this article is concerned have been changed only slightly.
That title of the Zivilprozessordnung was the subject of only one minor
substantive change in 1898. Several substantive changes in the
Strafprozessordnung were made between 1943 and 1964. These will be
dealt with later.
As the words "Court Personnel" in the title headlines indicate, these
provisions also are applied to persons other than professional judges.
These include associate lay judges in commercial matters
(Handelsrichter),7 jury men (Schiffen) and jurors (Geschworene), ele-
vated clerks of the courts to whom certain minor judicial functions in
civil proceedings are delegated (Rechtspfleger)," ordinary clerks of the
courts (Urkundsbeamten der Geschiiftsstelle) and other persons who
take down the minutes of the proceedings,"0 experts," interpreters,"
arbiters in arbitration proceedings 3 and the officials entrusted with the
service of process and the execution of judgments and court orders
(Gerichtsvollzieher).4 The provisions of the Zivilprozessordnung are, in
principle, also applicable to the personnel active in administrative and
other special proceedings.15 Neither the exclusion nor the
disqualification provisions are applicable to prosecutors or to attor-
neys.'" With regard to matters of so-called noncontentious jurisdiction
'STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] § 22-31, Schinfelder, Deutsche Gesetze (C.H. Beck Supp.
Nov. 1971) (W. Ger.).
7Law of Jan. 27, 1877, Concerning the Organization of Courts, Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG]
§ 112, [18771 RGBI. 41, which provides that these lay judges have all the rights and duties of a
professional judge during their tenure.
'STPO § 31. There are no jurors or jurymen in German civil proceedings.
'Law of Nov. 5, 1969, Concerning Auxiliary Judicial Officials (Rechtspflegergesetz), § 10,
[1969] BGBI. 1 2065.
'
0ZPO § 49; STPO § 31.
"IZPO § 406; STPO § 74. As to certain limitations concerning the exclusion or disqualification
of experts, see note 45 infra and text.
"
2GVG § 191, [1877] RGBI.
'
3ZPO § 1032. For an additional special ground for disqualification of arbiters see note 109
infra.
I4GVG § 155, [1877] RGBI. See also note 89, infra.
"See Law of Jan. 21, 1960, Concerning Administrative Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichts-
ordnung), § 54, [1960] BGBI. I 17. See also Law of Oct. 6, 1965, Concerning Tax Procedure
(Finanzgerichtsordnung), § 51, [19651 BGBI. 1 1477; Law of Sept. 3, 1953, Concerning Social
Security Courts (Sozialgerichte), § 60, [1953] BGBI. 1 1239; Law of Sept. 3, 1953, Concerning
Courts of Labor Relations (Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz), § 46 para. 2, [1953] BGBI. 1 1267.
"But, for a treatment of the applicability of the recent Federal Act on Public Officials
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(Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit) such as guardianship, administration of
estates, registration of commercial firms and associations, and land
registration, disqualification by the parties has been expressly denied.,7
III
German law makes a clear distinction between exclusion and disquali-
fication. 8 Exclusion of a judge, or other persons within the ambit of the
provisions, is defined in terms of the law's excluding him from exercising
his judicial authority. 9 The grounds for exclusion in German law corre-
spond roughly to the limited grounds allowed by American common law
for exclusion or disqualification, i.e. where the judge has a direct pecuni-
ary interest in the outcome of the litigation, has a close family relation-
ship to any of the parties or has been pieviously involved in some way
at a prior stage of the litigation.2"
In German civil proceedings a judge is excluded on the grounds of
pecuniary interest in cases where the judge himself is a party, or where
he has a joint interest in the claim or may be subject to a joint obliga-
tion, or where he may have to indemnify any party.2' Here, "party" is
defined as every person upon whom the decision will be binding.22 This
definition would not include shareholders in a corporation which is a
party to the suit. 23 Yet the formal, somewhat narrow meaning of
"party" is vastly enlarged by extending the exclusion to all court person-
nel who have any of the above proscribed financial relations to a party.
In the Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit Gesetz instead of "party" the phrase
"person interested" is used.24 However, this change in wording should
not result in any substantive change.
The analogous exclusion in German criminal proceedings is ordered
when the judge himself is injured by the punishable act,25 i.e. when any
(Bundesbeamtengesetz) to the question of the exclusion or disqualification of prosecutors see notes
79-82 infra and text.
"
7Law of May 17, 1898, Concerning Matters of Noncontentious Jurisdiction (Freiwillige
Gerichtsbarkeit Gesetz) [FGG] § 6 para. 2, cl. 2, [1898] RGBI. 189. For treatment of the constitu-
tionality of this provision see notes 86-90 infra and text.
"For a more detailed discussion of disqualification see Part IV infra.
1"ZPO § 41; STPO §§ 22, 23.
"Disqualification of Judges, supra note 2, at 323-27.
2-ZPO § 41.
2A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 41, annot. (2) (A) (29th ed.
1966): L. GAUPP, F. STEIN, M. JONAS, A. SCH(6NKE, R. POHLE, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESS-
ORDNUNG § 41, annot. III, (1) (a) (19th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as STEIN-JONAS].
"A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, supra note 22, at § 41, annot. 2(A); STEIN-JONAS, supra
note 22, at § 41, annot. II1, l(b).
2 FGG § 6, para. I, No. 1 [1898] RGBI. 189.
"STPO § 26.
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legal interest of the judge has been directly encroached. 6 An exception
exists in those cases in which the judge is merely a shareholder of a
corporation or a member of another juridical person against whom the
crime was directed. 7 The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court)
has declared by way of dictum, however, that a judge is not excluded if
the defendant, while committing a crime, also slanders his prospective
judge with the intention to thereby exclude him.18
It might appear strange that section 22 of the Strafprozessordnung
does not include a provision requiring the exclusion of a judge whenever
he is the person accused. However, it has been said that such a rule
would be superfluous since, as a matter of principle, no one can be his
own judge n This principle would apply not only to a judge who has been
officially accused but also to one who, without such an accusation, has
actually committed the crime or participated in it to any degree.30
With regard to the exclusion based on consanguinity or collateral
affinity, in civil procedure and in matters of noncontentious jurisdiction,
the word "party" is replaced in the statute by the phrase "in cases of a
spouse, ' 31 etc. Leading commentators interpret this to mean that the
spouse, etc., must be a "party" within the meaning described above.32
The exclusion based upon marriage also continues when the marriage
"no longer exists. 33 This definition embraces every type of marriage
dissolution; be it by death, divorce or annulment.34 Consanguinity,
affinity and relation through adoption exclude the judge (1) in all de-
grees of straight-line kinship, (2) with collateral consanguinity to the
third degree and (3) with collateral affinity to the second degree.35
Again, this exclusion also continues in any case where the marriage "no
longer exists. ' 36
26Judgment of July 26, 1951, I BGHSt. 299.
"O. SCHWARZ & TH. KLEINKNECHT, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG § 22, annot. 2 (27th ed. 1967);
L6WE & ROSENBERG, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ,
§ 22, annot. I (4)(a) para. 3 (21st ed. Supp. 1967).
2 8Judgment of May 5, 1954, [1954] Monatschrift f'dr Deutsches Recht [MDR] 628 (BGHSt.).
21L6WE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at § 22, annot. 1 (6).
'Old.
3
'ZPO § 41, Nos. 2 & 3; FGG § 6, para. 1, Nos. 2 & 3, [1898] RGBI.
32A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, supra note 22, at § 41, annot. (2) (B); STEIN-JONAS, supra
note 22, at § 41, annot. 111, (2). See also, notes 21 & 22 supra and text.
3See note 31 supra.3
'See A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, supra note 22, at § 41, annot. 2 (B); STEIN-JONAS,
:supra note 22, at § 41, annot. 111 (2).
"See ZPO § 41, Nos. 2 & 3; FGG § 6, para. 1, Nos. 2 & 3, [1898] RGBI. The counting is
always made according to the civil law method, i.e., up to the common ancestor and down again.
BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] §§ 1589, 1590, Schdnfelder, Deutsche Gesetze (C.H. Beck
Supp. Nov. 1971) (W. Ger.).31ZPO § 41, No. 3; FGG § 6, para. I, No. 3; BGB § 1590, para. 2.
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These same rules of exclusion pertaining to familial relationship pre-
vail in criminal proceedings with the substitution of the phrase "the
accused or injured person" for the word "party.""7 The exclusion in
criminal proceedings for reasons of familial relationship is subject to
criticism because it does not overcome two old doctrines of the German
Civil Code. These are that an illegitimate child is related only to his
mother and her relatives and not to his natural father;38 and the familial
relationship rules of exclusion are inapplicable where the judge is the
financ6 of the accused or injured person, a situation omitted in the
express provisions of the Codes. 9 This criticism is equally valid with
regard to the analogous exclusion in civil proceedings.
If a judge has been authorized to appear in an individual civil or
noncontentious proceedings, either as a lawyer by choice or by appoint-
ment, or as a legal representative of a party, he is excluded. 0 He is also
excluded in criminal proceedings if he is or has been the guardian of the
person accused or injured,' or if, in the same criminal proceedings, he
has acted as a prosecutor, a police official or as a lawyer of either the
complainant or the accused. 3
In civil and criminal proceedings a judge is excluded if he has actually
testified as a witness or as an expert at any stage of the same proceed-
ings.4 A special provision makes it clear, however, that the mere fact
that the expert has previously testified as an ordinary, non-expert wit-
ness is not grounds to prevent his giving expert testimony at a later
time. 5 The Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit Gesetz does not provide for an
exclusion for having testified as a witness or expert, possibly because in
some instances, for example in family matters, the judge may have to
use his own observations about the persons, living conditions or other
"
7STPO § 22, Nos. 2 & 3.
"As of July 1, 1970, this doctrine is no longer valid. See Law of Aug. 19, 1969, Concerning
the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock (Gesetz Ober die rechtliche Stellung der
nichtehelichen Kinder), [1969] BGBI. 1 1243.
'L6wE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27 at § 40, annot. 4, para. 1. After Jan. 1, 1970, a Notary
Public is forbidden to function in matters of his fiance6. See Law of Aug. 28, 1969, Concerning
Notarization (Beurkundungsgesetz), § 30(a), [1969] BGBI. 1 1513.
4
°ZPO § 41, No. 4; FGG § 6, para. 1, No. 4.
4 STPO § 22, No. 2.
"Judgment of Nov. 4, 1959, 14 BGHSt. 219, 222; SCHWARTZ & KLEINKNECHT, supra note 27,
at § 22, annot. 5.
"
3STPO § 22, No. 4.
"ZPO § 41, No. 5; STPO § 22, No. 5.
1ZPO § 406, para. I; STPO § 74, para. 1. As a rule an expert will be disqualified if he privately
and for remuneration renders an opinion to one of the parties to the proceeding before he testifies
at the request of the court. Judgment of July 20, 1965 (BGHSt.), [1965] MDR 926 (W. Ger. 1965).
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circumstances involved and to a certain extent become a witness in the
proceedings. It is questionable whether this remains good law for all
proceedings that are handled under this Act."
Also, in both civil and criminal proceedings, a judge is excluded at
the appeals stage if he has taken part in the lower court's decision in
the case. This principle is extended in civil proceedings to any participa-
tion in a decision in an arbitral proceeding which is later appealed to
the ordinary courts. 7 An exclusion based on judicial involvement at the
lower level refers only to former participation in the same proceedings."
Strangely, the Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit Gesetz does not contain an
analogous provision, although this Act does provide for appeal. 9
Because of certain aspects of German criminal procedure, the exclu-
sion based on participation in the decision of a lower court regarding
the case has been extended to judges in special situations. In Germany,
as in the United States, final criminal judgments from which a regular
appeal is no longer possible can be overturned under certain restrictive
conditions.59 There will be no attempt here to record in detail that
portion of the Strafprozessordnung which regulates post-conviction re-
lief. However, in connection with the exclusion of judges, it is important
to note that, as a rule, in these special proceedings it is the court whose
decision is attacked, and not an appellate court, which renders the deci-
sion made in this extraordinary post-conviction remedy." The exclusion
provision which prohibits a judge from sitting in proceedings in which
he has participated previously in a lower court is not applicable here.
The special post-conviction criminal proceeding is divided into several
stages. At the first stage the court decides whether the facts alleged and
the means of proof offered constitute a sound basis for the special
proceeding, and if it finds that they do not, the application is rejected
as "inadmissible. 5 2 If the application is considered "admissible," evi-
dence offered at the second stage to overturn the conviction is heard by
the court, and the court decides whether the resumption of the proceed-
ings is "justified." If the resumption is declared "justified" the third
stage is usually a new trial, although under certain circumstances the
person sentenced may then be acquitted without a new trial. 53
"See notes 86-89 infra, and text.
47ZPO § 41, No. 6; STPO § 23, para. 1.
"Judgment of Feb. 6, 1961, 15 BGHSt. 372.
19FGG § 19.
50STPO §§ 359-73 (a).
"STPO § 367.
521d.
-1d. §§ 369-71.
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Until the resumption of the proceedings is declared to be "justified"
there is a presumption in favor of the original judgment. 4 Because the
same court which issued the original judgment decides both the admissi-
bility and justification issues in the post-conviction proceedings, it is
extremely difficult to be successful in an attempt to force a resumption
of proceedings or to be successful when the resumption has been forced.
In 1964 a provision was adopted which excludes any judge from partici-
pating in decisions on the resumption of a proceeding if he has partici-
pated in the decision attacked.5 Also excluded is any judge who has
participated in the decision of a lower court which is then decided by a
higher court and that decision is subjected to post-conviction attack.
This exclusion is also applicable to the first stage of the special proceed-
ings in which the "admissibility" of the resumption proceedings is de-
cided." On the other hand, a judge who has participated only in an
appeal on questions of law rather than of fact is not excluded from
sitting in a court which hears the appeal from a denial of the resumption
proceedings. 7 No changes were made in the existing law with regard to
the corresponding special proceedings 8 in civil cases attacking final
decisions. 9
A last ground for exclusion in criminal proceedings arises from a
special German institution: the judge of inquiry (Un tersuchungsrichter).
While in general the public prosecutor handles the preparation of a case
until it is either dropped or presented to the court for indictment, 0 cases
of a certain gravity are subject to an inquiry conducted by the
Untersuchungsrichter.6' If the judge of inquiry has actually handled the
inquiry at any substantial stage he is precluded from being a member
of the court that rules on the indictment or of the court that hears the
trial of the case.12 Presiding trial judges have followed a restrictive
construction of this special provision. Thus, the presiding judge of a trial
court has not been excluded even where, in his capacity as trial judge,
he has made substantial pre-trial inquiries of whether the accused could
"4SCHWARZ & KLEINKNECHT, supra note 27, at § 370, annot. 1.
5 Law of Dec. 19, 1964, [19641 BGBI. 1 1067; STPO § 23, new para. 2.
'Judgment of Sept. 15, 1965 (Cir. Ct. of App. [OLG], Saarbriicken). [1966] Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift [NJW] 167 (W. Ger. 1966). Judgment of Dec. 21, 1965 (OLG., Bremen), [1966]
NJW 605 (W. Ger. 1966).
57Judgment of Oct. 25, 1965 (OLG, Bremen), [1966] NJW 168 (W. Ger. 1966).
5 ZPO §§ 578-91.
"A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, supra note 22, at § 41, annot. 2 (F).
'
0STPO § 151.
6Id. §§ 178, 184.
21d. § 23, para. 3.
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be considered an habitual criminal, or whether it would be advisable to
sentence him not only to incarceration, but also to security detention.3
Parallel to the question of exclusion of a judge from participation in
resumption proceedings is the problem of whether a judge can sit again
in a case that has been reversed and remanded by an appellate court or,
as in the United States, the case has to be retried because of a hung
jury.64 The personal involvement of a judge in these situations will, of
course, be of varying degrees. In the American situation a judge's in-
volvement and subconscious tendency to adhere to his former rulings
will probably not be as strong in a case involving a hung jury as in the
remand cases where the rulings or actions of the court have themselves
been challenged. Within the remand cases a judge's involvement will be
stronger where the reversal is based upon substantive grounds rather
than upon a technicality. In any case, such involvement will tend to be
stronger where the judge decides both issues of fact and law than where
the questions of fact will again go to a jury. No American decision has
been found which requires exclusion based on the mere fact of a judge's
renewed participation under any of the circumstances mentioned.,5
However, Connecticut and Indiana have enacted statutes" which in such
situations exclude the judge in both civil and criminal proceedings either
automatically or upon application of either party.
Under German law the hung jury situation cannot occur. There is no
jury in civil proceedings, and in criminal proceedings professional judges
and sometimes lay judges together decide both questions of fact and law.
The court is bound to reach a decision under the detailed rules which
determine the necessary voting majority in civil and criminal proceed-
ings. 7 The decision rendered can be attacked only by appeal. The extent
of any right to appeal and the various forms of appeal which are avail-
able are established by German procedural law. Therefore, in Germany
the problem in the case of remand is confined to the question of whether
a judge, either a professional or a lay judge, can sit again in a case that
was reversed and remanded on appeal by a higher court.
Until recently the only statutory rule that dealt with this problem in
63Judgment of Dec. I, 1965 (BGHSt.), [1966] MDR 427 (W. Ger. 1966).
"See also Ratner, Disqualification of Judges for Prior Judicial Actions, 2 How. L. J. 228, 229-
38 (1957).
"See U.S. v. Bryan, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968) which only suggests a self-disqualification of
the District Court judge for bias or prejudice in a re-trial after the first trial before him of almost
two months' duration had ended in a hung jury.
6CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-41 (1958); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-1404.
87GVG § 196.
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criminal proceedings was a provision in the Strafprozessordnungl8 per-
mitting the court of appeals to remand a case to a neighboring court of
the same state and of the same rank as the lower court whose decision
was reversed. It seems likely, however, that this provision was designed
more to take the case out of surroundings susceptible to public preju-
dices that could influence the judges in the new trial than to avoid the
renewed participation of individual judges. Somewhat closer to the
problem here considered is a provision in section 565 of the
Zivilprozessordnung which provides that the Federal Supreme Court
may remand a case to a different division of the Circuit Court of
Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) than the one from which the decision was
appealed. In an early interpretation the Federal Supreme Court admit-
ted that this provision had been adopted in 1898 as an amendment to
the Zivilprozessordnung in order to obviate the occasional inclination
of members of the Circuit Court of Appeals to sustain in some manner
their own legal view even though it had been overturned by the higher
court. Yet, in the same judgment the court expressly denied the exclu-
sion of a circuit court judge upon remand merely on the grounds of his
participation in the former proceeding. 9
The 1964 amendment to the Strafprozessordnung" has changed the
situation as to remand. Where, upon any appeal to any court higher
than the Superior Court (Landgericht),7' the appellate court reverses
and does not itself render a final judgment, which it is allowed to do
only within certain narrow limits, it is now required to remand the case
to another division of the court whose judgment was reversed or to
another court of equal rank within the same state." The public prosecu-
tor has the right to appeal the decision of a court which refuses to indict
or which in the indictment refers the case to a court of lower rank
contrary to his request.73 If this appeal is successful, a 1950 amendment
to the Strafprozessordnung4 allows the appellate court to order that the
trial be held before a division of the lower court other than the one
68STPO § 354, para. 2 in its pre-1964 version.
9Judgment of Oct. 24, 1902, 53 RGZ 4.
10Law of Dec. 19, 1964, [1964] BGBI. 1 1067.
7"The basic structure of the courts of general jurisdiction, which is almost completely uniform
throughout the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is: Amtsgerichte (Local Courts),
Landgerichte (Superior Courts), Oberlandesgerichte (Circuit Courts of Appeal), Bundes-
gerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court). GVG § 12. The first three types are courts of the states
(Liinder) which form the Federal Republic.
12STPO § 354, para. 2.
13id. § 210, para. 2.
"Law of Sept. 12, 1950, [19501 BGBI. 1 455, 629.
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whose decision was overturned, or before a neighboring court of equal
rank of the same state.75 Both the 1950 and 1964 amendments show a
clear trend aimed at bringing cases before judges that have not partici-
pated in the matter at an earlier stage. This trend is asserted more
strongly in the 1964 amendment because it compels the remand to a
different division or a different court, whereas the 1950 amendment left
such action to the appellate court's discretion.7"
However, remand to a different division of the lower court, or even
to another court, does not guarantee that a judge who participated in
the overturned judgment will not hear the case again. Due to changes
in the distribution of cases and organizational changes within the court,
a different division of the same court or another court may not always
be comprised of judges who have not previously tried the case. It ap-
pears that the spirit of the 1964 amendment requires the exclusion of a
judge who tried the same case upon a remand to a different division of
the lower court or a different court. Nevertheless, the legislative history
of the amendment shows that the German Federal Bar proposed to add
a specific requirement of exclusion for such a judge to the other exclu-
sions of section 23 of the Strafprozessordnung, but that both the Judici-
ary Committee of the Bundestag and the Bundestag itself refused to do
so after extensive deliberation. From this the Federal Supreme Court
concluded, first by way of dictum77 and later when dealing directly with
the issue,7 that a judge who participated in a reversed decision is not
by law excluded from participation after remand if he happens to be a
member of a different court or court division which deals with the case.
The Strafprozessordnung does not provide for exclusion or disqualifi-
cation of the public prosecutor. 79 However, the Federal Act on Public
Officials (Bundesbeamtengeseta) establishes a rule which requires fed-
eral officials to abstain from taking actions against their own interests
or against the interests of their relatives.80 The Federal Supreme Court,
75STPO § 210, para. 3.
71n Italy, after a remand, the judge who has participated in the overturned decision has to
disqualify himself in civil proceedings, C. PRO. Civ. § 51, No. 4 (Hoepli 1967), and is excluded in
criminal proceedings. C. PRO. PEN § 61, para. I (Hoepli 1967). See also M. CAPPELLETTI & J.
PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY, § 308, at 77 (1965).
"Judgment of Feb. 2, 1966, [1966] NJW 1718 (BGHSt.).
"Judgment of Sept. 9, 1966, 21 BGHSt. 142; See Judgment of Nov. 15, 1965 (OLG, Celle),
[1966] NJW 168 (W. Ger. 1966); Judgment of Apr. 21, 1966 (OLG, Hamm), [1966] NJW 2073
(W. Ger. 1966); Judgment of May 9, 1966 (OLG, Celle), [19661 NJW 1723 (W. Ger. 1966); Dahs,
Disqualification of Trial Judges after Remand by Court of Appeals, [1966] NJW 1691; but cf
LZ5WE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at § 354, annot. 2; see also part IV infra.
"See note 16 supra.
8 0Law of Oct. 22, 1965, [1965] BGBI. 1 1776, § 59.
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however, has brought public prosecutors within the statutory provision
for the exclusion of judges who have previously testified in the
proceedings if the prosecutor participates in the trial after giving testi-
mony."' However, a judgment rendered in violation of this rule must be
reversed only if there exists a possibility that the decision was based on
the testimony of the prosecutor in violation of the exclusion. Conse-
quently, no reversal is necessary where another official of the prosecu-
tor's office summarizes the testimony of his fellow prosecutor which
concerns only a technical point in connection with the activity of the
testifying prosecutor in the preliminary stages of the proceedings. This
situation illustrates the need for a more extensive statutory treatment
of the question of exclusion or disqualification of prosecutors.8 2
IV
Both the German Zivilprozessordnung and Strafprozessordnung
apply a somewhat strange organizational technique in dealing with the
problem of disqualification for bias or prejudice. The Codes contain
identical provisions: "A judge can be recused both in those cases where
he is excluded from exercising his judicial office by law and also on the
ground of fear of bias or prejudice. The recusation on the ground of fear
of bias or prejudice takes place when there is an adequate ground to
justify distrust in the impartiality of the judge." 3
Because the exclusion of a judge is effectuated by operation of law, a
plea of recusation to exclude a judge is only a procedural step that
enables a party to bring about this result. The plea does not have to be
invoked for the exclusion to apply. Since the exclusion is dictated by
law, this type of recusation is not subject to any limitations regarding
the stage of the proceedings or the point in time at which the recusing
party acquired knowledge of the ground for exclusion." On the other
hand, recusation on the ground of fear of bias or prejudice (hereinafter
called "disqualification"), is subject to such limitations. This situation
results from the fact that the participation of a judge subject to
disqualification is not unlawful where the right to have him disqualified
has not been claimed by any of the parties entitled to do so.
The Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit Gesetz, after providing that a judge
may disqualify himself for bias or prejudice, in section six, paragraph
8 Judgment of May 3, 1960, 14 BGHSt. 265.
82L6WE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, remarks preliminary to § 22, annot. 7, at 43.
s3ZPO § 42, paras. 1, 2; STPO § 24, paras. 1, 2.
'"ZPO § 43, STPO § 24.
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two, clause two, excludes such disqualification by others. 85 In this
connection the question has been raised whether or not a party has a
constitutionally guaranteed right to an impartial judge, such as that
found in the law of the United States under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution and under consti-
tutional provisions of the various states.8" The Federal Supreme Court
approached the problem in a limited way when it considered a disbar-
ment proceeding against an attorney under the Federal Bar Regulations
(Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung). The court decided that in a proceeding
of this character the provisions of the Zivilprozessordnung on disqualifi-
cation of a judge for fear of bias or prejudice must be applied in a
supplementary manner, 7 which, of course, opened the way for disquali-
fication by the parties.
Soon after this case the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) met the question directly and declared that
section six, paragraph two, clause two of the Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit
Gesetz was incompatible with article 191, paragraph one, clause two of
the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which reads: "No one may be denied the
jurisdiction of his lawful judge. '8 The court gave this clause multiple
meanings: First, in a formal sense, in each individual case no judge other
than the one to whom the case was allotted by the general procedural
norms and the organizational plans of the court can act upon or decide
the case.
Second, in a broader sense, the judicial task must be fulfilled not only
by a judge who is free from influence by a judicial administrator and is
secure in his independence, but also by a judge who is a "non-involved
third person," neutral and detached from the parties. Accordingly, there
must be provisions by which a judge who does not offer this guaranty
of impartiality may be excluded or disqualified. Thus, the court con-
cluded that section six, paragraph two, clause two of the Freiwillige
Gerichtsbarkeit Gesetz was incompatible with this requirement. 9
Regarding the substantive prerequisites of disqualification, it is inter-
esting that both the subjective element of "fear of bias or prejudice" and
5FGG § 6, para. 2, cl. 2 (original version). See note 88 infra.
6See Disqualification of Judges, supra note 2, at 355-60.
"
7 Judgment of Oct. 31, 1966, 46 BGHZ 195.
"Judgment of Feb. 8, 1967, 21 BVerfG 139. FGG § 6, para. 2, cl. 2 is, therefore, omitted in the
latest edition of Schdnfelder, Deutsche Gesetze (C. H. Beck Supp. Nov. 1971).
"
9Because the officials entrusted with serving of process and execution of court orders are not
judges it appears doubtful that the omission of their disqualification in GVG § 155 is unconstitu-
tional.
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the objective limitation which requires "a ground adequate to justify
distrust in the impartiality" are spelled out in the German law.9 0 The
leading commentaries to both Codes emphasize that there must be,
from the view point of the party concerned, sufficient objective grounds
to arouse in the eyes of a reasonable person distrust of the impartiality
of the judge." This view corresponds to the standard expressed in Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's statement.2
The factual situations where questions of the impartiality of the
judiciary may arise are of course as abundant and varied under German
law as under any legal system that provides for an impartial judiciary.
A few recent situations will illustrate the point.
The presence of the subjective element of fear, bias or prejudice was
denied where a party had been faced with the same facts and the same
judges in a prior proceeding but had not sought disqualification.13 In a
decision involving the remand of a case, a judge who had participated
in the former decision of the lower court declared himself "prejudiced
by law." Rightly, the appellate court corrected him by saying that there
is no such thing as "prejudice by law." 4 Anticipating a later decision
by the Federal Supreme Court, the court denied the exclusion of the
judge. The higher court on appeal came to the same conclusion. 5 It
emphasized that the new text of section 354, paragraph two of the
Strafprozessordnung was clearly not based upon a legislative belief that
a judge should be considered prejudiced on the mere ground that he had
taken part in a decision which later was reversed and remanded. There-
fore, the court concluded, the innovation in section 354, paragraph two
was no reason to abandon the doctrine that participation in a prior
decision, without more, offers no ground for the disqualification of the
judge. This same position was taken where a judge participated in a
decision against the wishes of the prosecutor. 7
The principle has also been applied where the only ground for disqual-
ifying a judge would be the fact that he has taken a certain position in
other proceedings or that he has defended a certain viewpoint in a
1*ZPO § 42, para. 2; STPO § 24, para. 2.
"STEIN-JONAS, supra note 22, at § 42, annot. II, para. 1; L(wE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27,
at § 24, annot. 2.
"
2See note I supra and text. As to case law and statutory development of disqualification in
American law see Disqualification of Judges 327-48, 350-51.
"
3Judgment of Aug. 10, 1965 (Landgericht Dortmund), [1966] NJW 206 (W. Ger. 1966).
"+Judgment of Nov. 15, 1965 (OLG Celle), [1966] NJW 168 (W. Ger. 1966).
'
5Judgment of Sept. 9, 1966, 21 BGHSt. 142. See note 78 supra.
"Judgment of Sept. 9, 1966, 21 BGHSt. 142.
"
7Judgment of July 15, 1960, 15 BGHSt. 40.
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scholarly publication." The question was solved somewhat differently
where, after a judge had been disqualified successfully in three other
pending proceedings, the court, in a fourth proceeding, ruled that the
party could reasonably fear that the judge would not be impartial.9
In the area of public statements of a judge, a member of the Federal
Constitutional Court who was also a university professor of
constitutional law was disqualified after he publicly expressed his opin-
ion concerning a problem then before the court. The court emphasized
that the issue here was not whether the judge was actually prejudiced
but rather whether a party evaluating all the surrounding circumstances
might reasonably doubt the impartiality of the judge. The court con-
ceded that the judge in his role as a university professor enjoyed the
academic right of freedom in his expressions, but felt that for the dura-
tion of his term as a member of the court, his duties as a judge must
prevail. Therefore, utterances made by the judge as a university profes-
sor had to be weighed according to the principles applicable to judges,
at least insofar as such utterances referred to a proceeding pending
before his court. The court gave weight to the fact that the judge had
not only publicized his conclusions on the issue but had also bolstered
his statements with the contention that liberal forces and forces hostile
to democracy had apparently joined hands to form an unholy alliance
opposing his viewpoint. On the basis of this derogatory statement, the
court concluded, a party to the proceeding could reasonably doubt the
impartiality of the judge. 00
A judge has been disqualified after making pretrial statements to the
press commenting on allegations made against a defendant as if the
allegations were ascertained facts. To prevent future disqualification,
the court recommended that trial judges should exercise special restraint
when confronted by members of the press.'
Members of the Federal Constitutional Court are not precluded from
the exercise of their judicial functions solely on the ground of prior
"
8Judgment of Mar. 7, 1963 (OLG, Nurnberg), [1964] Fundhefte fur Zivilrecht No. 8599 (W.
Ger. 1964). See also A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, supra note 22, at § 42, annot. 2 (B) (b);
STEIN-JONAS, supra note 22, at § 42, annot. II, para. 2; LdWE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at
§ 24, annot. 3(a). Each of these works cites older cases.
"Judgment of Apr. 5, 1965 (OLG, Nurnberg), [1965] MDR 667 (W. Ger. 1965).
"°Judgment of Mar. 3, 1966 (BVerfG), [1966] NJW 922 (W. Ger. 1966). The court mentioned
the fact, totally unique in the German court system, that at the Federal Constitutional Court no
substitute judge takes the place of a judge who has been disqualified; therefore, this fact creates a
duty of additional diligence in a member of this Court to give the appearance of impartiality. Id.
at 924.
t
'udgment of July 9, 1953, 4 BGHSt. 264.
[Vol. 3: 18
JUDICIAL RECUSATION
participation in the legislative process.' Relying on legislative history,
the Codes have been interpreted to prevent exclusion by operation of law
and disqualification for fear of bias or prejudice based solely upon such
participation. °3
The membership of a judge in certain organizations is, on principle,
not considered enough to warrant his disqualification. A motion to
disqualify all members of the Federal Constitutional Court who were
"members of a Marxist organization of any type, be it Communists,
Titoists or other species, including the Social Democratic Party" was
rejected because it was not directed against specific judges indicated by
name. The court declared in dictum that a judge's membership in a
political party without other acts is not a sufficient reason to justify his
disqualification.'"' Membership in a trade union by a lay judge of a labor
court was considered to be inadequate grounds for disqualification even
where rival union interests were cited as forming the basis for the claims
made in the suit. 05 In a proceeding against a judge for drunken driving,
the court rejected the self-disqualification of some of his colleagues since
it was based solely upon the fact that they and the defendant had long
been members of the same court.'"0 The same result was reached where
the divorce suit of a judge of a court of appeals was pending before his
own court and his fellow judges attempted to disqualify themselves. The
court ruled that the fear of lack of impartiality would justify disqualifi-
cation only where the judge who was party to the action had a relation-
ship with his fellow judges beyond that which normally characterizes
such professional association. 07
Exactly what pretrial or trial behavior on the part of a judge is neces-
sary to justify his disqualification is such a broad issue that little is to
be gained by selecting one example over another. Suffice it to say that
if a judge uses the contentions made in an application for his disqualifi-
cation to accuse the applicant of punishable slander, disqualification
would be justified.' 8 It is also clear that tensions between the judge and
a lawyer who represents a party in a case before the judge can lead to
disqualification.'"'
"
0 2Law of Mar. 12, 1951, [19511 BGBI. I 243, § 18, para. 3; Judgment of May 13, 1953, 2
BVerfG 295.
"
03Judgment of July 9, 1953, 4 BGHSt. 264.
"'Judgment of Feb. 22, 1960, [1961] MDR 26 (BVerfG). But see Judgment of Nov. 20, 1951,
[1952] NJW 272 (BGHSt.).
" Judgment of Feb. 6, 1964 (Labor Court, Berlin), [1964] Fundhefte fOr Zivilrecht No. 8061 (W.
Ger. 1964).
'"Judgment of Apr. 11, 1968 (OLG, Zweibrgcken) [1968] NJW 1439.
"
0 7Judgment of July 4, 1957 (BGHZ), [19571 NJW 1400 (W. Ger. 1957).
.. Judgment of Apr. 26, 1964 (LG, Aachen), [1965] MDR 667 (W. Ger. 1965).
'"Judgment of Dec. II, 1963 (LG, Aachen), [1964] MDR 422 (W. Ger. 1964).
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With regard to arbitration proceedings,"' the Federal Supreme Court
has made far-reaching conclusions where the fear of a lack of impartial-
ity by the arbiters is present. In one case an arbitration agreement
provided for a court of arbitration, composed only of members of a
commercial association, which would adjudicate disputes between mem-
bers and nonmembers of this association. The court reasoned that since
the nonmember was a foreign exporter, a conflict of interests between
the nonmembers and importer-members appeared natural. Therefore,
the court ruled that it was reasonable to fear that all of the possible
arbiters under the agreement would not be impartial. Going beyond the
issue of the arbiters' disqualification, the court concluded that because
the law requires every judicial function to be impartial, the arbitration
agreement was illegal and void so as to prohibit ordinary courts from
executing the judgment of the arbitration court."'
V
Procedurally, recusation, whether by exclusion or by disqualification
for fear of bias or prejudice, involves a number of varied aspects. The
special proceeding established for this objection is put in motion by a
recusation petition which is presented to the court of which the chal-
lenged judge is a member."' The right to petition is given in civil cases
to both parties"' and in criminal cases to the prosecutor, the private
complainant"4 and the defendant." 5 A party complainant can personally
initiate the recusation proceeding under both Codes which provide that
the petition may be submitted as a deposition before the clerk of the
court." 6 This procedure offers some assurance that the petition will
appear in an acceptable and understandable form and will contain at
least some degree of substantive relevance. This procedure also is an
exception to the rule that in courts above the local court level all civil
proceedings must be handled by an attorney who has been admitted to
the court."'
"See note 13 supra.
"'Judgment of Dec. 19, 1968, 51 BGHZ 255.
A special ground for disqualification also exists when an arbiter other than the one
appointed in the arbitration agreement "unduly delays the fulfillment of his duties."
ZPO § 1032, para. 2.
"
2ZPO § 44 para. 1; STPO § 26, para. 1.
"
3ZPO § 42, para. 2.
"Private complainants are admitted with regard to a limited selection of crimes. STPO § 374.
"5STPO § 24, para. 3.
"'See note 112 supra.
"
7ZPO § 78.
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As discussed above,"' in cases of judicial exclusion the special pro-
ceeding is only a vehicle by which the parties may initiate a judicial
examination of the obstacle. Therefore, the petition setting forth the
grounds for the exclusion is not subject to the time limitations that exist
in cases dealing with petitions for disqualification for fear of bias or
prejudice.'
Disqualification petitions are subject to different time limitations in
civil and criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings a party cannot dis-
qualify a judge because of a feared lack of impartiality if that party has
entered before such judge any oral argument concerning the case, or if
that party has made any motions during the civil proceedings without
availing himself of the ground for disqualification which the party then
knew to exist.
20
A disqualification petition in criminal proceedings may be presented
before the trial or during the trial until the time when the defendant is
questioned. This takes place almost at the very beginning of the trial.
Thereafter, the disqualification is allowed only for grounds which either
arise or become known to the petitioning party after the defendant's
presentation. In either of these instances, the petition must be presented
without undue delay. Furthermore, it can never be presented after the
"last word" of the defendant, a term which refers to the defendant's
opportunity to make a last statement to the judges immediately before
they retire for deliberation.' 2 ' This proscription against a petition for
disqualification after the "last word" of the defendant has been rightly
criticized. 22 There appears to be little justification for not recognizing
a prejudicial remark made by a judge after the "last word" but before
the court retires for deliberation as a possible ground for disqualifica-
tion. In criminal proceedings on appeal to a court higher than the Supe-
rior Court the disqualification petition against an appellate judge based
upon grounds then known, may be presented up to the time of the oral
pleadings.'2 As to grounds which appear later the rules described above
are applicable.
Time restrictions are imposed in both civil and criminal proceedings
so that the court can avoid the repetition that can result in advanced
"'See note 83 supra and text.
"'If the judge, while hearing testimony after the questioning of the defendant, discovers that his
father-in-law is among the persons injured, he is excluded, and the entire proceeding becomes void.
Judgment of July 6, 1954 (BGHSt.) [1954] MDR 656 (W. Ger. 1954).
"'ZPO § 43.
"2 STPO§ 25.
'2L6wE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at § 25, annot. 7, para. 4.
1
3STPO § 25.
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civil cases from a rehearing of the oral arguments or in advanced crimi-
nal cases from a trial de novo of the issues where a ground of fear of
bias or prejudice was known to the parties at an early stage of the
proceedings. On the other hand, such grounds should still be available
if they arose or became known only upon reaching a later stage of the
proceedings as, for example, a prejudicial attitude of a judge during the
oral argument in a civil proceeding or during the trial in a criminal
proceeding. This is especially important because in Geiman procedure,
especially criminal procedure, the judge plays a much stronger role than
in American procedure. In Germany the presiding judge not only directs
the proceedings in general but also questions the parties and other par-
ticipants,' a characteristic which gives the proceedings an inquisitorial
appearance as compared with the adversary system which is the back-
bone of Anglo-American procedure.
Recusation petitions in both civil and criminal proceedings must indi-
cate the grounds for the petition and, in cases where the normal time
limit has expired, must allege that the grounds for the petition either
arose or became known to the petitioner only after the normal deadline.
It also must be alleged that the petition in criminal proceedings is being
presented without undue delay.2 5 Finally, all of the factual elements
used to support the grounds and timeliness of the petition must be
"authenticated" by any means of proof except that of a sworn affidavit
of the petitioner.'26 The German phrase, here translated as "authenti-
cated," is "glaubhaft gemacht" which, though not requiring actual
proof, means "made highly probable." As to civil proceedings, the
Zivilprozessordnung provides generally that all means of proof can be
used for "authentication.""' Thus, documents, unsworn or sworn writ-
ten attestations of witnesses and experts, and written declarations of
counsel made with reference to his position as attorney at law are admis-
sible to "authenticate" the petition. The same has been held true in
criminal proceedings even though the Strafprozessordnung does not
have a general rule comparable to that of the Zivilprozessordnung. 8
Both Codes secure for the petitioner a right of access to the most impor-
tant proof in recusation proceedings, the testimony of the recused judge,
by providing: "For the authentication, reference may be made to the
124ZPO §§ 136, 139, 140; STPO § 238.
12 ZPO § 44, para. 2, 4; STPO § 26, para. 2.
12 ZPO § 44, para. 2; STPO § 26, para. 2.
127ZPO § 294.
1'2 L45wE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at § 26, annot. 5; SCHWARZ & KLEINKNECHT, supra note
27, at § 26, annot. 4.
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testimony of the recused judge." The challenged judge is required to
make an official statement as to the ground of the recusation.'29 Given
the strict disciplinary supervision of German judges with respect to all
nonjudicial official acts, it is perhaps justifiable that the courts afford
this statement considerable weight in deciding the recusation issue. On
the other hand, a court must take great care not to weigh the official
statement of the challenged judge or any facts presented to it by any
third source without also affording the petitioner an opportunity to
respond. Otherwise, the decision will be in violation of article 103,
paragraph one of the Grundgesetz.3 °
The Codes also contain a procedure for self-recusation of a judge
where no party demands his recusation in the following provision: "The
court that has jurisdiction over petitions of recusation must also decide
the issue raised when no petition is presented but a judge discloses
circumstances that could justify his recusation, or for other reasons
there arises some doubt as to whether a judge is excluded by law."''
This opens two avenues: First, self-recusation by a judge, and second,
though applicable only to exclusions by law, recusation by use of infor-
mation coming from any source as, for example, from a fellow judge, a
juror or a discussion in the press.'32 A judge has a civil service duty to
disclose to the court any circumstances of the type described either with
reference to himself or, at least in regard to possible exclusion by law,
with reference to other court personnel. However, this does not give rise
to a duty toward the parties in the main proceeding. Thus, such a party
could not claim to have been deprived of his right to a judge who is free
from any recusatory taints on the mere ground that a judge failed to
make such a disclosure. 3
The provision governing a judge's self-disclosure 4 refers, with the
restriction mentioned above, both to exclusion by law and disqualifica-
tion for fear of bias or prejudice. 13 Its application is not subject to time
1'2 ZPO § 44, para. 2, cl. 2; Id. para. 3; STPO § 26, para. 2, cl. 3; Id. para. 3.
13'Judgment of Oct. 11, 1966, 20 BVerfG 280, 282; Judgment of June 25, 1968 (BVerfG), [1968]
NJW 1621. Grundgesetz art. 103, para. I reads: "In court everybody is entitled to be heard
according to law."
131ZPO § 48, para. I; STPO § 30.
13 'STEIN-JONAS, supra note 22, at § 48, annot. I (L); A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, supra
note 22, at § 48, annot. I (b); L6WE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at § 30, annot. 4.
'Judgment of Mar. 14, 1964 (Bundesarbeitsgericht), [1964] Fundhefte des Zivilrechts No.
8605.
'
34See note 131 supra.
'LA. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, supra note 27, at § 48, annot. 1; STEIN-JONAS § 48, annot.
1 (2); L(5wE & ROSENBERG § 30, annot. I.
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limitations. 3 ' Rather, it sets in motion the court's consideration of a
purely internal matter in which the parties do not participate. 13 The
decision denying recusation in this internal process is not even commu-
nicated to the parties. Neither the parties nor the judge who made the
disclosure can appeal from any decision reached in this internal mat-
ter.3 8 On the other hand, such a decision does not prevent the parties
from later using the facts disclosed in this context in a recusation peti-
tion in the main proceedings, or in an appeal from the judgment in the
main case on the ground that, for example, the court had wrongly denied
the exclusion by law of one of its members. 39
VI
The problem of which court should decide the issues presented by a
recusation petition is somewhat complicated. The basic principle is that
the decision should be made by the same bench or division of which the
recused judge is a member, but without the personal participation of
the judge whose recusation is being sought. 140 Another judge must take
the place of the challenged judge on the latter's bench or division. 4' In
European continental procedure each bench or division must always sit
with the full number of judges who are assigned to it.' Should all of
the benches or divisions of a court become incapacitated to act on the
recusation decision, such as through the preliminary elimination of all
of its judges where multiple recusation petitions are directed against
'The limitations of the Zivilprozessordnung (see note 120 supra) do not lend themselves to the
special proceedings here under consideration. As to criminal procedure, see SCHWARZ & KLEIN-
KNECHT, supra note 27, at § 30, annot. 1; L45wE & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at § 30, annot. 1.
131ZPO § 48, para. 2. As to criminal proceedings, see SCHWARZ & KLEINKNECHT § 30, annot.
2; L45WE & ROSENBERG § 30, annots. 6, 8; but cf note 130 supra and text.
'A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH § 48, annot. 2; STEIN-JONAS § 48, annot. II; LGWE &
ROSENBERG § 30, annots. 6, 7.
1'3 See note 158 infra and text.
14*ZPO §§ 45 (para. 1), 47; STPO § 27, para. 1.
' 
1 n the level above local courts a bench or division consists of three judges. A bench or division
of the Superior Court for commercial matters consists of one professional and two lay judges. An
appeal from the judgment of a single judge of the local court who tried a criminal case without
participation of laymen is heard by a bench or division of the Superior Court composed of one
judge and two layment. GVG §§ 75, 76, 105. Where the single judge was assisted by laymen the
appeal division of the Superior Court consists of three judges and two laymen. GVG § 76, para.
2. Only above the level of the Superior Court may the benches or divisions consist of five or more
judges. E.g., GVG §§ 122, 132, 139. In criminal cases, laymen jurors or jurymen never participate
in recusation proceedings whether directed against a professional or lay judge. STPO §§ 27, 31.
However, in civil proceedings the lay judges of the divisions for commercial matters have the same
position and functions as the professional judges. GVG § 112.
"'See note 100 supra concerning the one exception to this principle in German law.
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each judge on the court, then the next higher court must make the
decision.'
In civil proceedings when the recusation petition is directed against a
judge of a local court of the lowest level, where the judicial functions
are not performed by a bench or division but by a single judge, the
recusation petition is acted upon by the Superior Court through one of
its three-man benches or divisions.'44 In criminal proceedings, where
matters may be more pressing, another judge of the local court decides
whether his colleague must be recused. 1" If the local judge sought to be
recused considers the recusation justified, no further decision is needed
in either a civil or a criminal proceeding.'
Recusation petitions may, of course, be easy vehicles to bring about
delays in proceedings. In Germany, courts have consistently held that a
judge whose recusation is sought may participate in a decision which
rejects the petition if the ground for such rejection is that the petition
was obviously an abuse of the right to recuse. 47 These holdings have
been promulgated in spite of the continued existence of contrary Code
provisions providing that a judge can never deny a recusation petition
directed against himself. Examples of petitions that are obviously abu-
sive of this right include those which do not indicate an individual judge,
and which seek to recuse judges in general solely because they may be
members of a political party.' Other obviously abusive cases are those
which merely seek to renew those formerly rejected petitions without
alleging any new grounds.' This exceptional method of summarily
rejecting abusive recusation petitions with the participation of the judge
against whom recusation is sought has been codified for criminal pro-
ceedings 50  through insertion of section 26 (a) into the
Strafprozessordnung. This section reads:
I. The court will reject the recusation of a judge as inadmissable if
(1) the recusation was not made in time, (2) no ground for the recusa-
113ZPO § 45, para. I; STPO § 27, para. 4.
'
4 ZPO § 45, para. 2, cl. 1.
"
5STPO § 27, para. 3, cl. 2. Occasionally, when the local court trying criminal cases consists of
the single judge and two laymen, a second judge is added if the case is of major proportions. GVG
§ 29.
'
1 ZPO § 45, para. 2; STPO § 27, para. 3, cl. 3. The last provision is equally applicable to the
judge of inquiry. See notes 61 and 62 supra and text.
4 See cases cited in A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH § 42, annot. I (B); STEIN-JONAS § 45,
annot. I. See also Judgment of Feb. 22, 1960 (BVerfG), [1961] MDR 26 (W. Ger. 1961).
"'Judgment of Feb. 22, 1960 (BVerfG), [19611 MDR 20 (W. Ger. 1961).
"A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH § 42, annot. I (B).
'"Law of Dec. 19, 1964, [1964] BGBI. 1 1067.
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tion or no means of probable proof was given or (3) obviously only a
delay or only ends foreign to the proceedings were to be pursued by
means of the recusation.
2. The court will reach a decision concerning the rejection according
to paragraph I without the removal of the challenged judge. Paragraph
1(3) requires a unanimous decision and the articulation of the specific
circumstances which result in the rejection ...
The remainder of paragraph two provides that, in any of the situa-
tions where a single judge sitting alone in a criminal proceeding is
challenged, he then has jurisdiction over the question of whether the
recusation petition should be rejected.
The new section appears to be self-explanatory. Whether the provi-
sion in section 26 (a), paragraph 1 (3) is adequate or whether it is of
practical importance is doubtful, since it will be difficult to show that
the exclusive aim of the petition is to delay the proceedings or that its
ends are "foreign to the proceedings," except, perhaps, where the peti-
tion is clearly repetitious.'5 '
VII
Although the decision granting or denying a recusation petition is
normally issued by the court against whose member recusation is
sought, with or without that member's participation, there is another
procedure by which an aggrieved party may claim recusation. In all
appeal proceedings which review issues of both fact and law and in those
which review only issues of law, one may claim that a judge who was
excluded by law has participated in a decision below. This is true in civil
and criminal cases5 2 and corresponds to the principle that recusation
petitions based upon exclusion of a judge by law are not subject to time
limitations.' 3 In civil proceedings if the question of exclusion by law
was raised in the court below by an unsuccessful recusation petition the
question cannot be raised a second time on appeal. "4 This restriction is
a consequence of the rules which govern independent appeals from an
interlocutory decision rejecting the recusation petition.15
As previously discussed, disqualifications based upon fear of bias or
prejudice are subject to time limitations.' 6 Thus, in appeal proceedings,
...LdwE & ROSENBERG § 26(a), annot. 11 (5), (6).
OZPO § 551, No. 2; STPO § 338, No. 2.
...See note 84 supra and text.
' ZPO § 551, No. 2.
'See note 169 infra and text.
"'
56See notes 120 and 121 supra and text.
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such disqualifications may be invoked only in the following circumstan-
ces: In civil proceedings, only in the rare case in which a judge partici-
pates in the decision of the lower court despite the fact that a
disqualification petition has been granted; 57 in criminal proceedings,
disqualification may also be invoked where a disqualification petition
directed against a judge of the lower court is unjustifiably rejected by
the lower court and the judge in fact participates in the judgment
below.'"" Again, the difference between the civil and criminal proceeding
results from the rules on special appeals from the interlocutory rejection
of recusation petitions by the lower court.
A further question which arises is whether a recusation petition will
be allowed by way of the extraordinary resumption proceedings after the
judgment in the original proceeding has become final.' In civil cases,
to a limited extent, the Zivilprozessordnung allows recusation on the
grounds of exclusion by law even at this late stage. This type of recusa-
tion proceeding closely follows the rules established for recusation in
ordinary appeal proceedings.' 6 ° Any former rejection of the recusation,
whether in the original recusation proceedings or in a special or general
appeal, bars a renewal of the recusation in the resumption proceed-
ings."9 ' As for disqualification for fear of bias or prejudice, the only case
admitted is the rare situation in which a judge has participated in the
decision despite the fact that his disqualification had been previously
granted' and there was no way to use this ground for disqualification
in an appeal.'63
The Strafprozessordnung omits recusation matters as a sufficient
ground for a resumption proceeding in criminal cases whether such a
proceeding would be in favor of or against the person sentenced' 4 This
omission effectively excludes claims for recusation as grounds for re-
sumption proceeding.'65 It only admits, with slight variations, a much
narrower ground for resumption connected with judicial behavior, found
also in the Zivilprozessordnung.6  Resumption is appropriate where "a
judge, juror or juryman who has participated in the judgment has been
1'7ZP0 § 551, No. 3.
...STPO § 338, No. 3.
'See notes 50-59 supra and text.
"'See note 152 supra and text.
"'ZPO § 579, para. 1, No. 2.
"'See note 157 supra and text.
"'1ZPO § 579, paras. I (No. 3), 2.
"'STPO §§ 359, 362.
'L6WE & ROSENBERG, § 359, annot. 12.
"'ZPO § 580, No. 5.
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guilty of a violation of his official duties with regard to the case, where
such violation is also subject to public punishment in a judicial criminal
proceeding" and where such professional or lay judge has actually been
sentenced for this violation or where the criminal proceeding against
him could not be carried out for reasons other than lack of proof.6"
Even if all these conditions exist, however, a resumption is not available
in favor of the person sentenced in the original proceeding if the defen-
dant himself somehow brought about the violation of the official duty
by the professional or lay judge. 68 There appears to be no justifiable
reason why, in criminal proceedings, recusation based on the judge's
participation in the former judgment, at least as to a judge who is
subject to the exclusion by law, should not be open to the same, albeit
limited, resumption as in civil proceedings.
VIII
Within certain limits there exists not only an appeal from a judgment
on the merits based on the faulty participation of a judge in the decision,
but also a special appeal from an interlocutory decision of the lower
court dealing with a recusation petition." 9 At the outset it should be
noted that an appeal is never allowed in either civil or criminal proceed-
ings from a decision which grants the recusation. 70 On the other hand,
an interlocutory recusation decision by a court below the rank of a
Circuit Court of Appeal 7' which rejects the recusation petition is subject
to an interlocutory appeal (Beschwerde) in both civil and criminal pro-
ceedings.' However, in criminal proceedings a denial of a recusation
request which seeks to recuse a judge who has "judged the case," i.e., a
judge who has participated in the case from the indictment up to the
final judgment,' can be appealed only "together with the judgment,"
i.e., through the ordinary appeal from the judgment on the merits.'
This requirement is applicable whether the recusation petition was ac-
tually denied on its merits or whether it was merely deemed inadmissible
according to section 26 (a) of the Strafprozessordnung."I The wording
"'STPO §§ 359 (No. 3), 362 (No. 3), 364.
"'STPO § 359, No. 3.
"'See note I 15 supra and text.
II'ZPO § 46, para. 2; STPO § 28, para. I.
'
7 ZPO § 567, para. 3; STPO § 304, para. 4. See Judgment of Dec. 8, 1966 (BGHZ), [1966] NJW
2062 (W. Ger. 1966).
'"ZPO § 46, para. 2; STPO § 28, para. 2, cl. 1.
"'Judgment of Dec. 4, 1951 (BGHSt.), [1952] NJW 234; L6WE & ROSENBERG, infra note 177.
'
7
'STPO § 28, para. 2, cl. 2; see note 158 supra and text.
'See Judgment of Oct. 22, 1953, 5 BGHSt. 153. See note 150 supra.
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of section 28, paragraph two, clause two, of this Code7 ' makes it clear
that it is the time of the denial of the recusation petition, and not the
time at which the recusation petition is presented which is determinative
of whether the decision refers to a judge "judging the case" or one who
is only active at an earlier stage.'
Where a special appeal lies it must be submitted within one week from
the communication to the petitioner of the decision denying the recusa-
tion. However, in criminal cases where the party concerned is present
at the time the decision is pronounced, the special appeal must be sub-
mitted within one week from the date of this pronouncement.'78
If the special appeal is dismissed no further regular or special appeal
is allowed.' Only in criminal proceedings can a lower court, whose
decision rejecting the recusation is being appealed, change its own deci-
sion. Even then such a decision may be changed only if the lower court
failed to give an adequate opportunity for the appealing party to present
his argument.8 " In an appellate court the same is true in regard to the
appellate court's decision on the special appeal.' 8' The system of special
appeals has limited a reexamination of denied recusations by means of
regular appeals from the judgment on the merits of the case.8 2
Due to the relative finality of the special interlocutory proceedings in
matters of recusation, the Federal Constitutional Court has allowed
constitutional appeal prior to the judgment on the merits when it is
claimed that the interlocutory decision has been reached in an unconsti-
tutional manner. 8 3 An example of such a constitutional violation would
be a recusation decision which was made without affording the recusing
party an opportunity to examine and respond to the official statement
of the challenged judge. 8 4
Ix
The Zivilprozessordnung and the Strafprozessordnung deal identi-
cally with the question of the effect of a recusation petition upon the
7
'See note 174 supra.
'L45WE - ROSENBERG § 28, annot. 6, para. 3.
'
7
'ZPO § 46, para. 2; Id. § 577, paras. 1, 2; STPO § 28, para. 2, cl. 1; Id. §§ 35, 311, paras. 1,
2.
1798TPO § 310.
's'ZPO § 577, para. 3; STPO § 311, para. 3, as amended by Law of Dec. 19, 1964 [1964] BGBI.
1 1067.
"'STPO § 311 (a) as amended by Law of Dec. 19, 1964, [1964] BGBI. 1 1067.
"82See notes 155-158 supra and text.
"SJudgment of June 25, 1968 (BVerfG), [19681 NJW 1621 (W. Ger. 1968).
"'See note 130 supra and text.
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further participation of a challenged judge between the time of the
presentation of the petition and the decision thereon. Both state: "A
judge whose recusation is sought is to carry out, before the disposing of
the recusation petition, only such acts as cannot be delayed."' 185 The
meaning of this provision is somewhat more complicated than its text
initially indicates. This complexity becomes clear if one remembers that
the recusation petition plays a different role if it is based upon an
exclusion of the judge by law than if it is based on a fear of bias or
prejudice. In the exclusion-by-law role the petition merely sets in motion
a declaratory pronouncement of an existing legal prohibition, whereas
in its disqualification role no provision of law is violated if a biased or
prejudiced judge participates in the proceedings so long as no party
seeks to recuse him on the ground of fear of bias or prejudice.'8" Al-
though the general purpose of the quoted provision is to prevent a
challenged judge from carrying out any acts that can be delayed and,
conversely, to permit him to do those acts which cannot be delayed, even
the concession allowing a challenged judge to carry out acts that cannot
be delayed is inapplicable to a judge who is excluded by law from any
participation. Thus, if, by the petition or otherwise, the judge is made
aware of any ground for exclusion by law, he can no longer participate
in any act.8 7 Beyond this the exclusion by law is effective even if the
excluded judge does not know anything about the grounds for his exclu-
sion. 88
Whether the above provision refers to the initial or final decision
concerning the recusation petition remains doubtful. Where the first
decision is not subject to a special interlocutory appeal but only to an
appeal from the decision of the court to the merits,'89 the Federal Su-
preme Court has decided (1) that the denial of the recusation petition
by the first court is to be considered final until the judgment on the
merits is entered, and (2) that with this denial any incapacitation of the
judge ceases, subject, of course, to an appeal from the judgment on the
merits.' At the same time the court stated that concerning cases in
which there is a special interlocutory appeal of the first denial of the
recusation petition, its predecessor, the Reichsgericht, had dealt with the
'1ZPO § 47; STPO § 29.
"
86See note 84 supra.
'
87A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH § 47, annot. I(A); STEIN-JONAS § 47, annot. III; L45WE
& ROSENBERG § 29, annot. 2,
'
8
8L4wE & ROSENBERG § 29, annot. 2.
'See note 174 supra and text.
"gJudgment of Oct. 22, 1953, 5 BGHSt. 153.
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question of whether the judge is incapacitated for acts that can be
delayed only until the first decision is made or until the decision is made
on the special appeal. The Federal Supreme Court did not reach a
decision on the question and found that the decisions of the
Reichsgericht had not been uniform in their treatment of it.", Neither
are the leading commentators uniform in their opinions."" An opinion
of the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg extended the incapacity of a judge
in a civil case, as to matters that are not urgent, until a decision is
reached on the special interlocutory appeal, or if no such appeal is
sought, then until the end of the period within which such an appeal
could have been sought. 93
CONCLUSION
The law of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of the
recusation of judicial personnel appears to be thorough and exhaustive.
It gives the parties concerned an ample choice of remedies to correct
the dangers which might result from the participation of persons either
excluded by law or those whose involvement could give rise to fears of
bias or prejudice by a party. Though the procedural provisions regulat-
ing the subject are sometimes involved, they are not unduly demanding
and pursue the aim of insuring both justice and the appearance of justice
without jeopardizing the effective completion of the argument in civil
proceedings or the trial in criminal proceedings. The treatment of recu-
sation within the framework of the German codes of procedure is not
perfect and not without gaps as is the case with every codification. But,
as with every well-drafted codification, a considerable degree of cer-
tainty about the law is created without preventing flexibility through
judicial interpretation and development.
'"Id.
" in civil cases, the incapacity is said to extend up to the final decision. A. BAUMBACH & W.
LAUTERBACH § 47, annot. 1; STEIN-JONAS § 47, annot. I. As to criminal cases, compare SCHWARZ
& KLEINKNECHT § 29, annot. 1 (B), with L5WE & ROSENBERG § 29, annot. 3.
"'Judgment of Mar. 3, 1965 (OLG Hamburg), [19651 MDR 141 (W. Ger. 1965).
1973]
